The New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests

Zeynep Irfanoglu, Shakun Mago and Roman Sheremeta
Additional contact information
Zeynep Irfanoglu: Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University
Shakun Mago: Department of Economics, Robins School of Business, University of Richmond

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: This experimental study compares sequential and simultaneous election contests. Consistent with the theory, we find evidence of the “New Hampshire effect” in the sequential contests, i.e., the winner of the first electoral battle wins the overall contest with much higher probability than the loser of the first battle. However, contrary to the theory, sequential contests generate higher expenditure than the simultaneous contests. This is mainly because in the sequential contests losers of the first battle do not decrease their expenditure in the second battle while winners of the first battle increase (instead of decreasing) their expenditure in the second battle. We discuss the implications of our findings both for policy makers and social scientists.

Keywords: election; sequential contests; simultaneous contests; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C91 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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http://www.chapman.edu/research-and-institutions/e ... aneous_2015-8-13.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:14-15

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