Central Bank Independence and inflation: the case of Greece

Theodore Panagiotidis and Afroditi Triampella

Revista de Economía del Rosario, 2006, No 2112

Abstract: This paper discusses the argument for Central Bank Independence (CBI) in the case of Greece. Using a time series approach and the last data available before Greece joined the EMU , the hypothesis that Central Bank Independence is important for controlling inflation is examined. Employing two indices, which serve as proxies for CBI, LegalCBI and TOR, the inverse relationship between CBI and inflation was confirmed. The interactions between the variability of inflation and CBI were also investigated. Furthermore, evidence was found to suggest that the rate of turnover Granger causes inflation.

Keywords: Central Bank Independece; inflation; Greece (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Central Bank Independence and Inflation: The case of Greece (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000151:002112

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