Perceiving Prospects Properly

Jakub Steiner and Colin Stewart

No 10123, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: When an agent chooses between prospects, noise in information processing generates an effect akin to the winner?s curse. Statistically unbiased perception systematically overvalues the chosen action because it fails to account for the possibility that noise is responsible for making the preferred action appear to be optimal. The optimal perception patterns share key features with prospect theory, namely, overweighting of small probability events (and corresponding underweighting of high probability events), status quo bias, and reference- dependent S-shaped valuations. These biases arise to correct for the winner?s curse effect.

Keywords: Evolution; Perception bias; Prospect theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Perceiving Prospects Properly (2016)
Working Paper: Perceiving Prospects Properly (2014)
Working Paper: Perceiving Prospects Properly (2014)
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