Shrouded Transaction Costs

Jean Tirole, Renato Gomes and Bourguignon, Hélène

No 10171, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: The proliferation of new payment methods on the Internet rekindles the old and unsettled debate about merchants? incentive and ability to differentiate price according to payment choice. This paper develops an imperfect-information framework for the analysis of platform and social regulation of card surcharging and cash discounting. It makes three main contributions. First, it identifies the conditions under which concerns about missed sales induce merchants to perceive that they must take the card. Second, it derives a set of predictions about cash discounts, card surcharges and platform fees that match, and shed light on existing evidence. Finally, it shows that the optimal regulation of surcharging is related to public policy toward merchant fees and substantially differs from current practice.

Keywords: Payment cards; Cash discounts; Card surcharges; Hold-ups in two-sided markets; Missed sales (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 L10 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-ict and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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