Dealer Networks

Schürhoff, Norman and Dan Li
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Norman Schuerhoff

No 10237, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Dealers in over-the-counter securities form networks to mitigate search frictions. The audit trail for municipal bonds shows the dealer network has a core-periphery structure. Central dealers are more efficient at matching buyers and sellers than peripheral dealers, which shortens intermediation chains and speeds up trading. Investors face a tradeoff between execution speed and cost. Central dealers provide immediacy by pre-arranging fewer trades and holding larger inventory. However, trading costs increase strongly with dealer centrality. Investors with strong liquidity need trade with central dealers and at times of market-wide illiquidity. Central dealers thus serve as liquidity providers of last resort.

Keywords: Decentralization; Immediacy; Liquidity; Market quality; Municipal bonds; Network analysis; Over-the-counter financial market; Trading cost; transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G12 G14 G24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-mst and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Dealer Networks (2019)
Working Paper: Dealer Networks (2014)
Working Paper: Dealer Networks (2014)
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