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Can active labor market policy be counter-productive?

Gilles Saint-Paul

No 10270, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study active labor market policies (ALMP) in a matching model. ALMPs are modelled as a subsidy to job search. Workers differ in their productivity, and search takes place along an extensive margin. An additional job seeker affects the quality of unemployed workers. As a result, the Hosios conditions are no longer valid. To replicate the optimum the worker share in bargaining must exceed the Hosios level, and one must impose a tax on job search activity. The coalition in favor of ALMP is also studied.

Keywords: Active labor market policies; Job matching; Hosios condition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 E32 J41 J63 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-lab, nep-mac and nep-pbe
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Related works:
Journal Article: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2015)
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2015)
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Can Active Labor Market Policy Be Counter-Productive? (2014) Downloads
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