Pricing a Package of Services

Dezsoe Szalay and Felix Ketelaar

No 10313, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study a tractable two-dimensional model of price discrimination. Consumers combine a rigid with a more flexible choice, such as choosing the location of a house and its quality or size. We show that the optimal pricing scheme involves no bundling if consumer types are affiliated. Conversely, if consumer types are negatively affiliated over some portion of types then some bundling occurs.

Keywords: Bundling; Monopoly; Multidimensional screening; Price discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-mkt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP10313 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10313

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP10313

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().