Which club should I attend, Dad?: Targeted socialization and production

Esther Hauk and Facundo Albornoz
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Cabrales

No 10321, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study a model that integrates productive and socialization efforts with network choice and parental investments. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this game. We first show that individuals underinvest in productive and social effort, but that solving only the investment problem can exacerbate the misallocations due to network choice, to the point that it may generate an even lower social welfare if one of the networks is sufficiently disadvantaged. We also study the interaction of parental investment with network choice. We relate these equilibrium results with characteristics that we find in the data on economic co-authorship and field transmission between advisors and advisees.

Keywords: Peer effects; Network formation; Cultural identity; Parental involvement; Immigrant sorting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I20 I28 J15 J24 J61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic, nep-soc and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Which Club Should I Attend, Dad?: Targeted Socialization and Production (2015)
Working Paper: Which club should I attend, Dad?: Targeted socialization and production (2014)
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