Networks in Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Great War of Africa

Fabrizio Zilibotti, Dominic Rohner and Michael Koenig
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Michael David König and Mathias Thoenig

No 10348, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective how a network of military alliances and enmities affects the intensity of a conflict. The model combines elements from network theory and from the politico-economic theory of conflict. We postulate a Tullock contest success function augmented by an externality: each group?s strength is increased by the fighting effort of its allies, and weakened by the fighting effort of its rivals. We obtain a closed form characterization of the Nash equilibrium of the fighting game, and of how the network structure affects individual and total fighting efforts. We then perform an empirical analysis using data on the Second Congo War, a conflict that involves many groups in a complex network of informal alliances and rivalries. We estimate the fighting externalities, and use these to infer the extent to which the conflict intensity can be reduced through (i) removing individual groups involved in the conflict; (ii) pacification policies aimed at alleviating animosity among groups.

Keywords: Africa; Alliances; Civil conflict; Congo war; Contest success function; Enmities; Network; Rainfall (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C36 C72 D74 D85 F51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Networks in Conflict: Theory and Evidence From the Great War of Africa (2017)
Working Paper: Networks in conflict: theory and evidence from the Great War of Africa (2015)
Working Paper: Networks in Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Great War of Africa (1220)
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