Insider Trading in the Bond Market: Evidence from Loan Sale Events

Massimo Massa and Daniel Schmidt

No 10446, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We investigate the pricing implications of the parallel trading of loans and bonds of the same firm. We show that loan, by making lenders share sensitive information about the borrower with the loan market participants, lower the information advantage of the asset managers affiliated to the lender who respond by reducing their stake in the bonds of the firm whose loans are sold, independently of considerations about the future firm value. This reduces information asymmetry in the bond market and improves its liquidity. This provides the first evidence of a direct informational link between the loan and bond secondary markets.

Keywords: Corporate bonds; Information asymmetry; Loan trading (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G21 G22 G23 G24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-mfd and nep-mst
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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