Monnet's Error?

Luigi Guiso, Luigi Zingales and Paola Sapienza

No 10559, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Entering a currency union without any political union European countries have taken a gamble: will the needs of the currency union force a political integration (as anticipated by Monnet) or will the tensions create a backlash, as suggested by Kaldor, Friedman and many others? We try to answer this question by analyzing the cross sectional and time series variation in pro-European sentiments in the EU 15 countries. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty seems to have reduced the pro-Europe sentiment as does the 2010 Eurozone crisis. Yet, in spite of the worst recession in recent history, the Europeans still support the common currency. Europe seems trapped: there is no desire to go backward, no interest in going forward, but it is economically unsustainable to stay still.

Keywords: Euro; Euro crisis; European union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E42 F45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Monnet’s error? (2016)
Working Paper: Monnet's Error (2015)
Working Paper: Monnet's Error? (2015)
Working Paper: Monnet’s Error? (2014)
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