Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Trade

Emmanuelle Auriol, Sara Biancini and Rodrigo Paillacar

No 10602, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The paper studies developing countries' incentives to protect intellectual property rights (IPR). IPR enforcement is U-shaped in a country's market size relative to the aggregated market size of its trade partners: small/poor countries protect IPR to get access to advanced economies' markets, while large emerging countries tend to free-ride on rich countries' technology to serve their internal demand. Asymmetric protection of IPR, strict in the North and lax in the South, leads in many cases to a higher level of innovation than universal enforcement. An empirical analysis conducted with panel data covering 112 countries and 45 years supports the theoretical predictions.

Keywords: Developing countries; Imitation; Innovation; Intellectual property rights; Oligopoly; Trade policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 F15 L13 O31 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-ino, nep-int, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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