Competition for advertisers and for viewers in media markets

Simon Anderson, Hans Jarle Kind and Øystein Foros

No 10608, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Standard models of advertising-financed media assume consumers patronize a single media platform, precluding effective competition for advertisers. Such competition ensues if consumers multi-home. The principle of incremental pricing implies that multi-homing consumers are less valuable to platforms. Then entry of new platforms decreases ad prices, while a merger increases them, and ad-financed platforms may suffer if a public broadcaster carries ads. Platforms may bias content against multi-homing consumers, especially if consumers highly value overlapping content and/or second impressions have low value.

Keywords: Media economics; Incremental ad pricing; Overlap; Multi-homing; Media bias; Genre choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D60 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cul, nep-mkt and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Competition for Advertisers and for Viewers in Media Markets (2018)
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