Voting and contributing when the group is watching

Charles Louis-Sidois ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Emeric Henry

No 10912, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Members of groups and organizations often have to decide on rules that regulate their contributions to common tasks. They typically differ in their propensity to contribute and often care about the image they project, in particular want to be perceived by other group members as being high contributors. In such environments we study the interaction between the way members vote on rules and their subsequent contribution decisions. We show that multiple norms can emerge. We draw surprising policy implications, on the effect of group size, of supermajority rules and of the observability of actions.

Keywords: Image concern; Information aggregation; Public good; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic, nep-pol and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Voting and Contributing When the Group Is Watching (2020)
Working Paper: Voting and Contributing when the Group Is Watching (2020)
Working Paper: Voting and Contributing when the Group Is Watching (2020)
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