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Is bread gained by deceit sweet to a man? Corruption and firm efficiency

Jan Hanousek, Anastasiya Shamshur and Jiri Tresl

No 10951, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study the effects of corruption on firm efficiency using a unique comprehensive dataset of private firms from 14 Central and Eastern European countries for the period from 2000 to 2013. We find that an environment characterized by a high level of corruption has an adverse effect on firm efficiency. This effect is amplified for firms with a lower propensity to behave corruptly, i.e. foreign-controlled firms and firms managed by female CEOs, while domestically-owned firms and firms with male CEOs are not penalized. At the same time, an environment characterized by considerable heterogeneity in perception of corruption is associated with an increase in firm efficiency. This effect is particularly strong for foreign firms from low-corruption countries, while no effect is observed for firms managed by female CEO.

Keywords: Ceo; Efficiency; Corruption; Europe; Ownership structure; Panel data; Stochastic frontier (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C33 D24 G32 L60 L80 M21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-eff and nep-eur
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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