Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence

Jo Seldeslachts, Tomaso Duso, Joseph Clougherty and Miyu Lee

No 10959, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our empirical results suggest that phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as ? unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions ? phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries; i.e., industries where the HHI is above the 0.2 cut-off level employed by the EC. Additionally, we find that phase-1 remedies do not deter clearly pro-competitive mergers, but do deter potentially anti-competitive mergers in high-concentration industries.

Keywords: Competition policy; Deterrence; European commission; Merger policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K40 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-eur and nep-ind
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Related works:
Journal Article: EFFECTIVE EUROPEAN ANTITRUST: DOES EC MERGER POLICY GENERATE DETERRENCE? (2016)
Journal Article: Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence? (2016)
Working Paper: Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence (2015)
Working Paper: Effective European antitrust: Does EC merger policy generate deterrence? (2015)
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