Residual Deterrence

Daniel Garrett and Dilmé, Francesc
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Francesc Dilme

No 10994, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Successes of law enforcement in apprehending offenders are often publicized events. Such events have been found to result in temporary reductions in offending, or "residual deterrence". We provide a theory of residual deterrence which accounts for the incentives of both enforcement officials and potential offenders. Our theory rests on the costs of reallocating enforcement resources. In light of these costs, we study the determinants of offending such as the role of public information about enforcement and offending.

Keywords: Deterrence; Enforcement; Reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Residual Deterrence (2019)
Working Paper: Residual Deterrence (2019)
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