Optimal Taxation with Behavioral Agents

Xavier Gabaix and Emmanuel Farhi

No 11008, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper develops a theory of optimal taxation with behavioral agents. We use a general behavioral framework that encompasses a wide range of behavioral biases such as misperceptions, internalities and mental accounting. We revisit the three pillars of optimal taxation: Ramsey (linear commodity taxation to raise revenues and redistribute), Pigou (linear commodity taxation to correct externalities) and Mirrlees (nonlinear income taxation). We show how the canonical optimal tax formulas are modified and lead to a rich set of novel economic insights. We also show how to incorporate nudges in the optimal taxation frameworks, and jointly characterize optimal taxes and nudges. We explore the Diamond-Mirrlees productive efficiency result and the Atkinson-Stiglitz uniform commodity taxation proposition, and find that they are more likely to fail with behavioral agents.

Keywords: Behavioural public finance; Inattention; Mistakes; Nudges (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (55)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal Taxation with Behavioral Agents (2020)
Working Paper: Optimal Taxation with Behavioral Agents (2017)
Working Paper: Optimal Taxation with Behavioral Agents (2015)
Working Paper: Optimal Taxation with Behavioral Agents (2015)
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