Technological Progress and Ownership Structure

Harald Hau, Sandy Lai and Heng Geng

No 11064, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Innovation processes under patent protection generate hold-up problems if complementary patents are owned by different firms. We show that in line with Hart and Moore (1990), shareholder ownership overlap across firms with patent complementarities helps mitigate such hold-up problems and correlates significantly with higher patent investment and more patent success as measured by future citations. The positive innovation effect is strongest for concentrated overlapping ownership and for the cases when the overlapping shareholders are dedicated investors.

Keywords: Patents; Hold-up problems; Innovation; Institutional ownership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G31 G32 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-sbm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: Technological Progress and Ownership Structure (2015)
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