Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service
Imran Rasul and
Daniel Rogger ()
No 11078, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research
Abstract:
We study how the management practices bureaucrats operate under correlate to the quantity of public services delivered, using data from the Nigerian Civil Service. We have hand-coded independent engineering assessments of 4700 project completion rates. We supplement this with a management survey in the bureaucracies responsible for these projects, building on Bloom and Van Reenen [2007]. Management practices matter: increasing bureaucrats' autonomy is positively associated with completion rates, yet practices related to incentives/monitoring of bureaucrats are negatively associated with completion rates. Our evidence provides new insights on the importance of management in public bureaucracies in a developing country setting.
Keywords: Bureaucracy; Management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J33 O20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr and nep-ppm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)
Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP11078 (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service (2018) 
Working Paper: Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service (2013) 
Working Paper: Management of bureaucrats and public service delivery: evidence from the Nigerian civil service (2013) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11078
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP11078
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().