EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service

Imran Rasul and Daniel Rogger ()

No 11078, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study how the management practices bureaucrats operate under correlate to the quantity of public services delivered, using data from the Nigerian Civil Service. We have hand-coded independent engineering assessments of 4700 project completion rates. We supplement this with a management survey in the bureaucracies responsible for these projects, building on Bloom and Van Reenen [2007]. Management practices matter: increasing bureaucrats' autonomy is positively associated with completion rates, yet practices related to incentives/monitoring of bureaucrats are negatively associated with completion rates. Our evidence provides new insights on the importance of management in public bureaucracies in a developing country setting.

Keywords: Bureaucracy; Management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J33 O20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr and nep-ppm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP11078 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Management of bureaucrats and public service delivery: evidence from the Nigerian civil service (2013) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11078

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP11078

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().

 
Page updated 2026-05-19
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11078