Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory

Laurent Bouton, Aniol Llorente-Saguer and Frederic Malherbe

No 11087, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of observed subject behavior. There are, however, cases where organizing the data seems to require a mix of strategic and sincere voting. This pattern of behavior would imply that the way majority rule with veto power is framed may significantly affect the outcome of the vote. Our data strongly supports such an hypothesis.

Keywords: Constructive abstention; Framing; Information aggregation; Laboratory experiments; Unanimity rule; Veto power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP11087 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Unanimous rules in the laboratory (2017)
Working Paper: Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11087

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP11087

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().