Agency Conflicts Around the World

Schürhoff, Norman, Erwan Morellec and Boris Nikolov
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Norman Schuerhoff

No 11243, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We use a dynamic model of financing decisions to quantify agency conflicts across legal and institutional environments and decompose their effects into wealth transfers among stakeholders and value losses from policy distortions. Our estimates show that agency costs are large and vary widely across and within countries. Legal origin and provisions for investor protection affect agency costs, but they are more relevant for curtailing governance excesses than guarding the typical firm. Agency costs split about equally into wealth transfers and value losses from policy distortions, the latter being larger where ownership is dispersed. Incentive misalignment captures 60% of country variation in leverage.

Keywords: Capital structure; Agency conflicts; Corporate governance; Structural estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Agency Conflicts around the World (2018)
Working Paper: Agency Conflicts Around the World (2016)
Working Paper: Agency Conflicts Around the World (2016)
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