Institutional Investors and Corporate Political Activism

Rui Albuquerque, Rocholl, Jörg and Chendi Zhang

No 11301, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: The landmark decision by the U.S. Supreme Court on Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission asserts for the first time that corporations benefit from First Amendment protection regarding freedom of speech in the form of independent political expenditures, thus creating a new avenue for political activism. This paper studies how corporations adjusted their political activism in response to this ruling. The paper presents evidence consistent with the hypothesis that institutional investors, in particular public pension funds, have a preference for not using the new avenue for political activism, a preference not shared by other investors.

JEL-codes: G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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