Women ask for less (only from men): Evidence from alternating-offer bargaining in the field

Nagore Iriberri

No 11514, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study gender differences and gender interaction effects in bargaining. Data from a TV show offer a unique opportunity to observe both bargaining outcomes and behavior, with sizable stakes. The matching between male proposers (strong position) and female responders (weak position) is different from all other matchings. No differences are observed in opening offers, but women demand less from men than from women. This differential behavior yields bargaining outcomes that are more favorable for men and less favorable for women when male proposers encounter female responders.

Keywords: Alternating-offer bargaining; Gender interaction effects; Field data; Gender differences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 J16 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem, nep-gth and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP11514 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11514

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP11514

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().