Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives

Shlomo Weber, Alexander Shapoval and Zakharov Alexei

No 11527, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: In this paper we examine the effects of valence in a continuous spatial voting model between two incumbent parties and one potential entrant. All parties are rank-motivated and are driven by their place in the electoral competition. One of our main results is that a sufficiently wide valence gap between the incumbents yields an equilibrium in which no entry will occur. We also show that an increase in valence shifts the high-valence incumbent party closer to the median voter, while the low-valence incumbent selects a more extreme platform.

Keywords: Valence; Candidates; Electoral game; Rank objectives; Electoral equilibrium; Distribution of ideal points (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Journal Article: Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives (2019)
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