Promotion Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from Chinese Schools

Albert Park and Naureen Karachiwalla

No 11704, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We provide evidence that promotion incentives influence the effort of public employees by studying China's system of promotions for teachers. Predictions from a tournament model of promotion are tested using retrospective panel data on primary and middle school teachers. Consistent with theory, promotions are associated with wage increases, higher wage increases are associated with better performance, and teachers increase effort in years leading up to promotion eligibility but reduce effort if they are repeatedly passed over for promotion. Evaluation scores are positively associated with teacher time use and with student test scores, diminishing concerns that evaluations are manipulated.

Keywords: Teachers; Incentives; Promotions; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J33 J45 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm, nep-lma, nep-tra and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Promotion incentives in the public sector: Evidence from Chinese schools (2017)
Working Paper: Promotion Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from Chinese Schools (2017)
Working Paper: Promotion Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from Chinese Schools (2017)
Working Paper: Promotion Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from Chinese Schools (2015)
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