Cost-Benefit Analysis of Leaning Against the Wind

Lars Svensson

No 11739, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: A simple and transparent framework for cost-benefit analysis of "leaning against the wind" (LAW), that is, tighter monetary policy for financial-stability purposes, is presented. LAW has obvious costs in the form of a weaker economy if no crisis occurs and possible benefits in the form of a lower probability and smaller magnitude of (financial) crises. A second cost - less obvious, overlooked by previous literature, but higher - is a weaker economy if a crisis occurs. For representative empirical benchmark estimates and reasonable assumptions the result is that the costs of LAW exceed the benefits by a substantial margin. The result is robust to alternative assumptions and estimates. A higher probability, larger magnitude, or longer duration of crises - typical consequences of ineffective macroprudential policy - all increase the margin of costs over benefits. To overturn the result, policy-interest-rate effects on the probability and magnitude of crises need to be more than 5-40 standard errors larger than the benchmark estimates.

Keywords: Monetary policy; Financial stability; Macroprudential policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 G01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (155)

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Journal Article: Cost-benefit analysis of leaning against the wind (2017)
Working Paper: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Leaning Against the Wind (2016)
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