A theory of regional conflict complexes

Thierry Verdier and Arthur Silve

No 11915, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Civil conflicts spill over to neighboring countries. This paper proposes a theory of the contagion of civil wars, emphasizing two main channels of diffusion of a conflict. First, weak territorial control facilitates the emergence of a regional market for war inputs in the “porous frontier†. Second, refugees fleeing a conflict zone may unwittingly destabilize their host country. In both cases, the contagion effect is nonlinear and creates multiple equilibrium situations of regional complexes of civil conflicts. This helps explain observed patterns of regional clustering of conflict and state capacity, and raises identification issues in the measurement of the contagion effect. We also derive a positive spillover of civil wars: governments are sometimes in a position to avoid contagion by improving their institutions. Finally,we explore policy implications for military intervention, military and institutional cooperation, and the international coordination of refugee policy.

Keywords: Civilwar; Contagion; Porous frontier; State capacity; Military intervention; Institutional cooperation; Refugees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 N40 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03
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Related works:
Journal Article: A theory of regional conflict complexes (2018)
Working Paper: A theory of regional conflict complexes (2018)
Working Paper: A theory of regional conflict complexes (2018)
Working Paper: A theory of regional conflict complexes (2018)
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