Bid-to-cover and yield changes around public debt auctions in the euro area

Roel Beetsma, Massimo Giuliodori, Jesper Hanson and Frank de Jong

No 11932, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Earlier research has shown that euro-area primary public debt markets affect secondary markets. We find that more successful auctions of euro area public debt, as captured by higher bid-to-cover ratios, lead to lower secondary-market yields following the auctions. This effect is stronger when market volatility is higher. We rationalize both findings using a simple theoretical model of primary dealer behavior, in which the primary dealers receive a signal about the value of the asset auctioned.

Keywords: Public debt auctions; Bid-to-cover ratios; Primary and secondary markets; Primary dealers; Volatility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G11 G12 G14 G18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec
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Related works:
Journal Article: Bid-to-cover and yield changes around public debt auctions in the euro area (2018)
Working Paper: Bid-to-cover and yield changes around public debt auctions in the euro area (2017)
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