Strategic Sample Selection

Marco Ottaviani, Alfredo Di Tillio and Sørensen, Peter Norman

No 12202, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper develops a notion of multivariate accuracy to characterize the welfare impact of sample selection from a larger presample. Maximal selection benefits or hurts a decision maker with interval dominance ordered preferences if the reverse hazard rate of the data distribution is log-supermodular—as in location experiments with normal noise—or log-submodular. Applying the result to auctions, we show that under non-pathological conditions the information contained in the winning bids decreases as the number of bidders increases. Exploiting a connection to extreme value theory, we quantify the limit amount of information when the presample size goes to infinity, as under perfect competition. In the context of a model of equilibrium persuasion with costly information, we also derive implications for the design of selected experiments when selection is made by an examinee, a biased researcher, or contending sides with the peremptory challenge right to eliminate a number of jurors.

Keywords: Strategic selection; Persuasion; Comparison of experiments; Dispersion; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C90 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ecm, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Strategic Sample Selection (2021)
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