Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction

Dirk Bergemann and Välimäki, Juuso
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Juuso Välimäki

No 12240, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We provide an introduction into the recent developments of dynamic mechanism design with a primary focus on the quasilinear case. First, we describe socially optimal (or efficient) dynamic mechanisms. These mechanisms extend the well known Vickrey-Clark-Groves and D'Aspremont-Gérard-Varet mechanisms to a dynamic environment. Second, we discuss results on revenue optimal mechanism. We cover models of sequential screening and revenue maximizing auctions with dynamically changing bidder types. We also discuss models of information management where the mechanism designer can control (at least partially) the stochastic process governing the agent's types. Third, we consider models with changing populations of agents over time. This allows us to address new issues relating to the properties of payment rules. After discussing related models with risk-averse agents, limited liability, and different performance criteria for the mechanisms, we conclude by discussing a number of open questions and challenges that remain for the theory of dynamic mechanism design.

Keywords: Dynamic mechanism design; Sequential screening; Dynamic pivot mechanism; Bandit auctions; Information management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction (2019)
Working Paper: Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction (2018)
Working Paper: Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction (2017)
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