Ethical Voting in Multicandidate Elections

Laurent Bouton and Benjamin Ogden

No 12374, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study the behavior of ethical voters in multicandidate elections. We consider two common electoral rules: plurality and majority runoff. Our model delivers crisper predictions than those of the pivotal voter model. An equilibrium always exists, and is unique for a broad range of parameter values. There are two types of equilibria: (i) the sincere voting equilibrium (voters vote for their most-preferred candidate), and (ii) Duverger's Law equilibria (two candidates attract all the votes). These never coexist. We identify the features of an election that favor sincere voting. Consistent with evidence, incentives to vote sincerely are stronger under majority runoff.

Keywords: Multicandidate elections; Ethical voting; Group-based voting; Plurality rule; Majority runoff rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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