Welfare and Redistribution in Residential Electricity Markets with Solar Power

Nicola Pavanini, Fabian Feger and Doina Radulescu

No 12517, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: An increasing number of households installing solar panels and consuming the energy thus produced raises two challenges for regulators: network financing and vertical equity. We propose alternative tariff and subsidy designs for policymakers to incentivise solar panel adoptions and guarantee that network costs are recovered, while trading off efficiency, equity, and welfare motives. We estimate a structural model of energy demand and solar panel adoption, using a unique matched dataset on energy consumption, prices, income, wealth, solar panel installations, and building characteristics for 165,000 households in Switzerland from 2008-2014. Our counterfactuals recommend the optimal solar panel installation cost subsidies and two-part energy tariffs to achieve a solar energy target. We show that, relative to installation cost subsidies, relying on marginal prices to incentivise solar panel adoptions is more cost efficient and progressive across the income distribution, but generates a larger aggregate welfare loss.

JEL-codes: D12 D31 L94 L98 Q42 Q52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP12517 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12517

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP12517

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().