Credit controls as an escape from the trilemma. The Bretton Woods experience

Eric Monnet

No 12535, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The macroeconomic policy “trilemma†is widely used as a framework to discuss the rationale for capital controls and monetary policy autonomy under the Bretton Woods system (1944-1971). Without denying its usefulness, I highlight two facts at odds with assumptions underlying the “trilemma†argument. First, conflicts between internal and external objectives were uncommon. Second, using quantitative credit controls allowed central banks to disconnect their interest rate from the domestic monetary policy stance. They assigned the interest rate to the external side while managing domestic credit expansion with direct quantitative controls. This paper documents that such mechanism was explicitly considered by contemporary economists and central bankers as a way to escape international financial constraints. In such an environment, capital controls were used to complement credit controls. Interest rate spreads were neither a good measure of capital controls nor of central bank autonomy.

Keywords: Bretton woods; Trilemma; Capital controls; Credit controls; Reserve requirements; Central banking; Macroprudential policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 F32 N20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-his, nep-hpe, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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