Gender Differences in Alternating-Offer Bargaining: An Experimental Study

Nagore Iriberri and Hernandez-Arenaz, Iñigo

No 12561, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: A laboratory study was carried out to analyze the relationship between ambiguity regarding the sharing norms in structured alternating-offer bargaining and gender differences in bargaining. Symmetric environments, where a 50:50 split emerges as the unique sensible norm, showed the lowest ambiguity and gender differences were absent. We increased ambiguity by introducing asymmetries into the bargaining environment by making one bargaining party get a higher share than the other (due to empowerment, entitlement or informational asymmetries), but without imposing new sharing norms. In these situations, men were less likely to reach an agreement, but, when they did, they obtained a larger share of the pie. As a result, men and women showed similar overall earnings but earnings were lower when bargaining with men. We found suggestive evidence that gender differences diminished when we reduced ambiguity regarding the sharing norms by providing information about other participants’ agreements in asymmetric environments.

Date: 2022-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gen and nep-gth
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