Tax Evasion and Inequality

Gabriel Zucman, Niels Johannesen and Alstadsæter, Annette
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Annette Alstadsæter

No 12781, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper estimates the size and distribution of tax evasion. We combine random audits, tax amnesties, and leaks from offshore financial institutions matched to wealth records in Scandinavia. Tax evasion rises sharply with wealth: 3% of personal taxes are evaded on average, versus 25%–30% in the top 0.01% of the wealth distribution. A model of the supply of evasion services can explain this gradient. Taking tax evasion into account increases inequality substantially. After using tax amnesties, evaders do not seem to increase legal tax avoidance, suggesting that fighting evasion can allow governments to collect more taxes from the wealthy.

Date: 2018-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-iue, nep-law, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Tax Evasion and Inequality (2019)
Working Paper: Tax Evasion and Inequality (2018)
Working Paper: Tax Evasion and Inequality (2017)
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