What drives the legalization of immigrants? Evidence from IRCA

Giovanni Facchini, Alessandra Casarico and Tommaso Frattini

No 12790, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We develop a model to understand the trade-offs faced by an elected representative in supporting an amnesty when a restrictive immigration policy is in place. We show that an amnesty is more desirable the more restricted are the occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants and the smaller is the fiscal leakage to undocumented immigrants via the welfare state. Empirical evidence based on the voting behaviour of U.S. Congressmen on the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 provides strong support for the predictions of our theoretical model.

Keywords: Migration policy; Amnesties; Roll call votes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 O51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-mig
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Journal Article: What drives the legalization of immigrants? Evidence from IRCA (2018)
Working Paper: What Drives the Legalization of Immigrants? Evidence from IRCA (2016)
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