Policy Experimentation, Redistribution and Voting Rules

T. Renee Bowen and Vincent Anesi

No 12797, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study conditions under which optimal policy experimentation can be implemented by a committee. We consider a dynamic bargaining game in which, each period, committee members choose to implement a risky reform or implement a policy with known returns. We first show that when no redistribution is allowed the unique equilibrium outcome is generically inefficient. When committee members are allowed to redistribute resources (even arbitrarily small amounts), there always exists an equilibrium that supports optimal experimentation for any non-collegial voting rule. With collegial voting rules, however, optimal policy experimentation is possible only with a sufficient amount of redistribution. We conclude that veto rights, not constraints on redistribution, constitute the main obstacle to optimal policy experimentation.

Keywords: Voting rules; Redistribution; Committees; Experimentation; Reforms; Endogenous status quo (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C78 D61 D71 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Policy Experimentation, Redistribution and Voting Rules (2018)
Working Paper: Policy Experimentation, Redistribution and Voting Rules (2018)
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