Benefit reentitlement conditions in unemployment insurance schemes

Torben M Andersen, Michael Svarer and Kristoffersen, Mark Strøm

No 12802, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The past employment history - employment requirements - is part of the eligibility conditions for unemployment insurance in most western countries. In a standard search-matching model, we show how employment requirements strengthen the reentitlement effect and thereby changes the trade-off between insurance and incentives in the design of the optimal insurance scheme. Deploying employment requirements for benefit eligibility may thus allow for both higher benefit levels and longer duration, and yet labor market performance is improved. When the need for insurance increases due to higher risk aversion, employment requirements becomes less lenient, and oppositely when the environment becomes more risky.

Keywords: Reentitlement effects; Incentives; Job-search; Unemployment insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 H3 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias, nep-lab and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP12802 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Journal Article: Benefit reentitlement conditions in unemployment insurance schemes (2018)
Working Paper: Benefit Reentitlement Conditions in Unemployment Insurance Schemes (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12802

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP12802

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().