A Model of Search with Price Discrimination

Natalia Fabra and Mar Reguant

No 12823, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We introduce observable heterogeneity across buyers into a model of simultaneous search. Buyers' di erences are informative about their willingness to search, giving rise to price discrimination even if they all have the same willingness to pay. We analyze and compare equilibrium outcomes when price discrimination is allowed and when it is not. We nd that the price comparison across consumers as well as the e ects of banning price price discrimination critically depend on the elasticity of the search cost distribution. Interestingly, for normally distributed search costs, there is an inverted U-shape relationship between prices and buyers' size. Similarly, a ban on price discrimination hurts small and large buyers, to the bene t of the medium-size ones.

Keywords: Third-degree price discrimination; Search; Bid solicitation; Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: A model of search with price discrimination (2020)
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