Mobility with private information and privacy suppression

Vaiva Petrikaite and Hämäläinen, Saara
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Saara Hämäläinen

No 12860, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We consider a problem of matching guests with suitable hosts in a dynamic, directed search market in which a visitor’s private taste and plans are subject to change. Guests learn about hosts by visiting them personally, which reveals whether the destination merits a repeat visit. Hosts prefer to target guests with high willingness to pay but, assuming full privacy, cannot tell whether they should rely on previous visitors or hold a sale to attract new visitors. We find that guests’ private learning reduces matching frictions by sustaining longer visits to particularly fitting destinations. The strength of this effect depends on competition intensity. We also discover that a ban of tracking and targeting technologies may reduce consumer surplus. Specifically, access to visitor data enables their earlier hosts to respond more rapidly to demand changes, which can intensify competition and put downward pressure on prices.

Keywords: Mobility; Private information; Privacy suppression; Directed search; Experience goods; Changing tastes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
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