Crime, Broken Families, and Punishment

Yves Zenou, Emeline Bezin and Thierry Verdier

No 13014, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We develop a two-period overlapping generations model in which both the structure of the family and the decision to commit crime are endogenous and a culture of honesty is transmitted intergenerationally by families and peers. Having a father at home might be crucial to prevent susceptible boys from becoming criminals, as this facilitates the transmission of the honesty trait against criminal behavior. By "destroying" biparental families and putting fathers in prison, we show that more intense crime repression can backfire because it increases the possibility that criminals' sons become criminals themselves. Consistent with sociological disorganization theories of crime, the model also explains the emergence and persistence of urban ghettos characterized by a large proportion of broken families and high crime rates. This is because for children who come from these broken families, negative community experiences (peer effects) further encourage their criminal participation. Finally, we discuss the efficiency of location and family policies on long-term crime rates.

Keywords: Crime; Social interactions; Neighborhood segregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J15 K42 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-law, nep-net, nep-soc and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Crime, Broken Families, and Punishment (2022)
Working Paper: Crime, Broken Families, and Punishment (2022)
Working Paper: Crime, Broken Families, and Punishment (2022)
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