Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan

Enikolopov, Ruben

Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan

No 13053, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Using data from a field experiment across 500 villages in Afghanistan, we study how electoral accountability of local institutions affects the quality of governance. In villages with newly created elected councils, food aid distributed by local leaders is more likely to reach needy villagers. However, this effect is observed only if the council is mandated to be the entity responsible for managing the distribution. In the absence of such a mandate the presence of elected councils increases embezzlement without improving aid targeting. Thus, while elected councils can improve governance, unclear and overlapping mandates may increase rent-seeking and worsen governance outcomes.

Keywords: Political institutions; Field experiment; Democratization; Governance quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-pol and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Do elected councils improve governance ? experimental evidence on local institutions in Afghanistan (2013)
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