Politically feasible reforms of non-linear tax systems

Pierre Boyer and Felix Bierbrauer

No 13059, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We present a conceptual framework for the analysis of politically feasible tax reforms. First, we prove a median voter theorem for monotonic reforms of non-linear tax systems. This yields a characterization of reforms that are preferred by a majority of individuals over the status quo and hence politically feasible. Second, we show that every Pareto-efficient tax system is such that moving towards lower tax rates for below-median incomes and towards higher rates for above median incomes is politically feasible. Third, we develop a method for diagnosing whether a given tax system admits reforms that are politically feasible and/or welfare-improving

Keywords: Political economy; Optimal taxation; Tax reforms; Non-linear income taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP13059 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Journal Article: Politically Feasible Reforms of Nonlinear Tax Systems (2021)
Working Paper: Politically Feasible Reforms of Non-Linear Tax Systems (2020)
Working Paper: Politically Feasible Reforms of Non-Linear Tax Systems (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13059

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP13059

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().