Multi-candidate Political Competition and the Industrial Organization of Politics

Thierry Verdier and Avner Seror

No 13121, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In this paper, we present a microfounded theory of multi-candidate political competition taking an "industrial organization" perspective of politics. The analytical framework is shown to be exible enough to address several applications on the topics of special interest politics, coalition formation in the legislature in proportional elections, and redistribution under alternative electoral rules.

Keywords: Probabilistic voting models; Frechet distributions; Redistribution; Public policy; Runoff; Plurality; Proportionality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP13121 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13121

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP13121

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().