Teams and Bankruptcy

Ramin Baghai, Rui Silva and Luofu Ye

No 13198, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study how the human capital embedded in teams is reallocated in corporate bankruptcies using data on US inventors. We find that bankruptcies reduce team stability. After a bankruptcy, team-dependent inventors produce fewer and less impactful patents. This points to the loss of team-specific human capital as a cost of resource reallocation through bankruptcy. However, this cost is limited by the ability of the labor market and the market for corporate control to preserve teams. Inventors with past collaboration are likely to move jointly to a new firm after bankruptcy, and the productivity of team inventors that relocate together increases.

Keywords: Teams; Teamwork; Team-specific human capital; Bankruptcy; Labor productivity; Creative destruction; Innovation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G33 J24 J63 O31 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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