Anti-social Behavior in Groups

Michal Bauer, Cahlíková, Jana, Dagmara Celik-Katreniak, Julie Chytilová, Lubomir Cingl and Želinský, Tomáš
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Tomáš Želinský, Jana Cahlikova and Dagmara Celik Katreniak

No 13315, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper provides strong evidence supporting the long-standing speculation that decision-making in groups has a dark side, by magnifying the prevalence of anti-social behavior towards outsiders. A large-scale experiment implemented in Slovakia and Uganda (N=2,309) reveals that deciding in a group with randomly assigned peers increases the prevalence of anti-social behavior that reduces everyone’s but which improves the relative position of own group. The effects are driven by the influence of a group context on individual behavior, rather than by group deliberation. The observed patterns are strikingly similar on both continents.

JEL-codes: C92 C93 D01 D64 D74 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Anti-social Behavior in Groups (2018)
Working Paper: Anti-Social Behavior in Groups (2018)
Working Paper: Anti-social Behavior in Groups (2018)
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