Identity, Beliefs, and Political Conflict

Guido Tabellini and Nicola Gennaioli

No 13390, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We present a theory of identity politics that builds on two ideas. First, voters identify with the social group whose interests are closest to theirs and that features the strongest policy confict with outgroups. Second, identfication causes voters to slant their beliefs of self and others toward group stereotypes. The theory yields two main implications: i) votersÂ’ beliefs are polarized along the distinctive features of salient groups; ii) economic shocks that render new groups salient bring about large and non standard changes in beliefs and policies across many issues. In particular, exposure to globalization or cultural changes may induce voters to switch identities, dampening their demand for redistribution and exacerbating conflicts in other social dimensions. We show that survey evidence is broadly consistent with these implications.

Date: 2019-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Identity, Beliefs, and Political Conflict* (2021)
Working Paper: Identity, Beliefs, and Political Conflict (2019)
Working Paper: Identity, Beliefs, and Political Conflict (2018)
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