Building consensus: Shifting strategies in the territorial targeting of Turkey's public transport investment

Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés and Davide Luca
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Andrés Rodríguez-Pose

No 13621, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: A growing amount of research explores how the allocation of regional development monies follows electoral reasons. Yet, the existing literature on distributive politics provides different and contrasting expectations on which geographical areas will be targeted. We focus on proportional representation (PR) systems. While in such settings governments have incentives to target core districts and punish foes’, we suggest that when incumbents attempt to build a state-party image they may broaden the territorial allocation of benefits and even target opposition out-groups. We exploit data on Turkey’s public transport investment for the period 2003-2014 and in-depth interviews to provide results in support of our hypothesis.

Keywords: Public investment; Transport infrastructure; Distributive politics; Politics of development; Turkey (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H70 O18 O43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara, nep-cdm, nep-tre and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Journal Article: Building consensus: shifting strategies in the territorial targeting of Turkey's public transport investment (2019)
Working Paper: Building consensus: Shifting strategies in the territorial targeting of Turkey's public transport investment (2019)
Working Paper: Building consensus: shifting strategies in the territorial targeting of Turkey's public transport investment (2019)
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