Consumer Privacy and Serial Monopoly
Nikita Roketskiy (n.roketskiy@ucl.ac.uk) and
Venkataraman Bhaskar
No 13686, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
We examine the implications of consumer privacy when preferences today depend upon past consumption choices, and consumers shop from different sellers in each period. Although consumers are ex ante identical, their initial consumption choices cannot be deterministic. Thus ex post heterogeneity in preferences arises endogenously. Consumer privacy improves social welfare, consumer surplus and the profits of the second-period seller, while reducing the profits of the first period seller, relative to the situation where consumption choices are observed by the later seller.
Keywords: Consumer privacy; Dynamic demand; Endogenous screening; Nonlinear pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-dcm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Consumer privacy and serial monopoly (2021)
Working Paper: Consumer Privacy and Serial Monopoly (2019)
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